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DRAFT 
GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFICATION OF PHASES AND TYPES OF AN 
FMD OUTBREAK AND RESPONSE 
March 2013 
Version 1.7 
The following guidelines are being developed as an aid for rapid decision making to 
facilitate response planning and development of business continuity plans in the event 
of a foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United States or North America. 
INTRODUCTION  
The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement inherent in the United States and 
North American livestock industries will present unprecedented challenges in the event of 
an FMD outbreak.  Strategies for the response to, and management of, an FMD outbreak 
will change as the outbreak progresses and will depend upon the magnitude, location, 
other characteristics of the outbreak, and vaccine availability. At the beginning of an 
outbreak, or with a small outbreak, the highest priority is to take all measures possible to 
prevent disease spread, to stamp-out the disease as rapidly as possible, and to reestablish 
the United States as an FMD-free country.  In an extensive outbreak of FMD, the highest 
priority is to ensure a secure food supply for the nation and the world by ensuring business 
continuity for food animal producers and all associated industries.  
The impacts of disease spread from a small focal outbreak are extremely high, as compared 
to the cost of stop movement and destruction of limited numbers of animals. Whereas the 
impact of a complete stop movement and stamping-out policy are extremely high in an 
extensive outbreak as compared to the cost of limited further spread of FMD. These 
impacts must be weighed and the response strategies quickly adjusted as the outbreak 
unfolds.   
Having pre-defined phases and potential types of an FMD outbreak will facilitate 
development of adaptable emergency response and business continuity plans for the U.S. 
livestock industry. The phase is a temporal stage in an FMD outbreak response, the type is a 
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categorical measure of magnitude of an FMD outbreak and its response.1 The phase and 
type of the FMD outbreak is expected to change over time and could be designated by the 
authorities responsible for managing the response.  Different regions of the United States 
or segments of the animal agriculture industry may be designated as being involved in 
different phases or types of an FMD outbreak simultaneously.  Different species may have 
different recommendations regarding stamping-out and/or appropriate vaccination 
strategies.  
A goal of the outbreak response will be to regain FMD-free status (either with or without 
vaccination) in order to resume exportation of animals and animal products. The 
internationally accepted standards for regaining FMD-free status are found in the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code (TAHC) 
(http://www.oie.int/international-standard-setting/terrestrial-code/access-online/).  
Reference to the relevant section of the 2012 OIE TAHC for regaining FMD-free status is 
found for each type of response below.   
The phase and type designations below are guidelines and may be modified by the 
responsible authorities to best fit the specific outbreak. Descriptors defining different 
phases and types (for example, small, moderate, and extensive) are intentionally left vague 
in a recognition that responsible authorities will need to make decisions based on available 
information regarding specific outbreak characteristics.  
PROPOSED PHASES AND TYPES  
HEIGHTENED ALERT PHASE:  FMD  OUTBREAK IN EITHER CANADA OR MEXICO ,  
BUT NOT THE UNITED STATES  
FMD in either Canada or Mexico threatens to spread to the United States (Control Areas are 
near or cross over the U.S. border)  
 Discontinue all imports of susceptible animals and animal products from the 
affected country into the United States. 
 Work collaboratively with Canada and/or Mexico to establish Control Areas around 
Infected Premises and Contact Premises.  
 Collaborate with Canada and/or Mexico to implement controlled stop movement of 
susceptible animals in the Control Area and restrict other movements (vehicles, 
animal products, etc.) as appropriate (except as permitted by the incident in 
                                                                
1
 Please note that ‘type’, in this document, only refers to the magnitude of the FMD outbreak and the response. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency also uses the word ‘type’ to describe five levels of complexity for 
incident response; there is not a relationship between the ‘types’ discussed here and those FEMA incident 
management ‘types’ which refer more specifically to event complexity. 
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accordance with FAD response and business continuity plans or equivalent 
plans/permitting processes in place in Canada or Mexico). 
 Advise State and Tribal authorities to ensure that their premises ID data is up to 
date and to be prepared for animal tracing. 
 Activate Incident Management Teams as needed. 
 Implement an enhanced national FMD surveillance plan for the Control Area(s) and 
Free Area. 
 Collaborate with Canada and/or Mexico to enforce biosecurity protocols within the 
Control Area. 
 Activate the National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) if necessary to deploy assets to 
support U.S. activities or to assist Canadian or Mexican response efforts. 
 Collaborate with Canada and/or Mexico to initiate stamping-out of infected and 
contact herds. 
 Identify the strain(s) of FMD virus (FMDV) and consult with Canada and Mexico to 
decide whether to activate the North American FMD Vaccine Bank (NAFMDVB).  
 Enhance surveillance for FMD at U.S. slaughter plants and ports of entry. 
 Conduct tracing and surveillance of cloven-hooved species imported from the FMD 
affected country within the last two incubation periods (28 days) prior to the date of 
first infection of the index case. 
 Initiate stamping-out of contact herds in the United States (unless the number, or 
the size, of the herds precludes stamping-out quickly enough to stop disease 
spread). 
STEP S  TO  T AK E UPON  T H E FI RS T CAS E IN  T HE US,  CAN ADA ,  OR  MEXI CO  AND TO  CON TI NUE 
FOR  T HE DURATION  OF THE OUTBR EAK :  
 Advise all livestock operations (including auction markets, exhibitions, etc.) in the 
United States to implement FMD-specific biosecurity plans and continue until 
freedom from FMD is re-established. 
 Emphasize, and enhance enforcement of, requirements for garbage feeding of swine 
in the United States. 
 Allow movement of milk from premises with no evidence of infection with FMDV to 
processing according to the State, regional, and national Secure Milk Supply (SMS) 
Plans. 
 Allow movement of products from non-susceptible animals (including eggs and egg 
products) from the Control Area (from premises with no infected susceptible 
species) into commerce with adequate truck and driver biosecurity for the duration 
of the outbreak. 
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PHASE 1  
The period of time from the confirmation of the first FMD case in the United States until there 
is reasonable evidence to estimate the extent of the outbreak.  The transition to Phase 2 
should be accomplished as soon as possible, with a goal of less than 4 days (96 hours).  
 Establish Control Areas around Infected Premises and Contact Premises.  
 Activate and deploy appropriate Incident Management Teams. 
 Implement controlled stop movement of susceptible animals in the Control Area and 
restrict other movements in the Control Area (vehicles, etc.) as appropriate (as 
permitted by specific FMD response and business continuity plans). 
 Implement an enhanced national FMD surveillance plan for the Control Area(s) and 
Free Area. 
 Enforce biosecurity protocols within the Control Area. 
 Activate the National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) (if local resources have been 
exhausted). 
 Initiate stamping-out of infected and contact herds (unless the number, or the size, 
of herds precludes stamping-out quickly enough to stop disease spread). 
 Identify the strain(s) of FMDV and consult with Canada and Mexico to decide 
whether to activate the NAFMDVB.  
 Activate Joint Information Center and coordinate with public hotlines and media 
resources. 
 Activate state livestock emergency response teams or notify to be on “standby.” 
 Communicate with State EOCs to partially or fully “stand-up” their operations and 
activate Multiagency Coordination Groups.  
 
PHASE 2 
 
Surveillance and epidemiology provides timely evidence of the extent of the outbreak 
(characterized as one of six types) to support planning and decision making by Incident/Area 
Command.  
TYPE  1  -  FO CAL  FMD  OUTBRE AK :    
Focal area of infection limited to one State or small region with low to moderate livestock 
numbers on relatively small premises.  Epidemiologic investigation and surveillance 
indicates that it has not spread beyond the initial few premises.  The Infected Premises 
have not had extensive animal movement and are not too large to depopulate quickly.  
Rapid stamping-out is feasible.  
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 Continue strict quarantines/movement controls for live animals, vehicles, etc. 
within the Control Area (movement as permitted by specific Secure Food Supply 
business continuity plans). 
 Continue stamping-out with rapid depopulation, disposal, cleaning, and disinfection 
of Infected and Contact Premises. 
 Design and implement surveillance to obtain data, and then apply to the OIE for 
recovery of FMD-free status without vaccination.  FMD-free status without 
vaccination may be regained 3 months after the last case if stamping-out or 
stamping-out with vaccinate-to-kill or vaccinate-to-slaughter strategies are used 
(OIE TAHC Article 8.5.9). 
TYPE  2  –  MODE RATE  REGIO N AL FMD  OUTBRE AK :     
A few focal areas of infection limited to a region with low to moderate livestock numbers 
on small to medium size premises.  Depending on animal density, sufficient vaccine and 
resources can be made available to vaccinate designated susceptible domestic animals to 
reduce virus transmission. Epidemiologic investigation and surveillance indicate FMDV has 
not spread beyond the region.  The Infected Premises have not had extensive animal 
movement out of the Control Area and are not too large to depopulate quickly.   
 Establish Area Command to coordinate multiple Incident Management Teams in the 
affected region. 
 Continue strict quarantines/movement controls for live animals, vehicles, etc. 
within the Control Area.  Consider allowing movement of non-infected animals 
(including vaccinates) according to the Secure Food Supply Plans.  Animals must 
meet vaccination withdrawal period (if it applies) and be able to pass FSIS ante-
mortem inspection to be slaughtered.  
 Continue rapid stamping-out of Infected and Contact Premises. 
 Consider establishing a Containment Vaccination Zone and/or Protection 
Vaccination Zone with eventual depopulation and disposal, or slaughter, of 
vaccinated animals.  
o Vaccinate-to-kill: killing means any procedure which causes the death of an 
animal that does not enter the human food chain. 
o Vaccinate-to-slaughter: slaughter means any procedure which causes the 
death of an animal by bleeding where the animal may enter the human food 
chain. 
o Vaccinate-to-live: the animal is allowed to live out its useful life-span. 
 Officially identify all vaccinated animals for surveillance and monitoring purposes. 
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 No new vaccinations will be administered more than 28 days after the last known 
new case of FMD is detected.  Design and implement surveillance to obtain data, 
then apply to the OIE for recovery of FMD-free status.  FMD-free status may be 
attained 3 months after the last case and the slaughter of all vaccinated animals, or 6 
months after the last case or the last vaccination if all vaccinated animals are not 
slaughtered (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.9). 
TYPE  3  –  LARGE  REGI ONAL  FMD  OUTBREAK :    
Multiple areas of infection are detected in a region, or the type, number and/or size of 
infected and contact herds are too great to depopulate quickly enough to suppress disease 
spread.  Depending on the epidemiological situation, there may not be sufficient vaccine 
and resources available to vaccinate designated susceptible domestic animals to reduce 
virus transmission.  The number of susceptible animals may be too great to consider only a 
vaccinate-to-kill strategy—a vaccinate-to-slaughter and/or vaccinate-to-live strategy may 
also be needed.  There is a reasonable likelihood that the response strategy, including 
vaccination, will bring the outbreak under control. 
 Establish Area Command to coordinate multiple Incident Management Teams in the 
affected region. 
 Continue strict quarantines/movement control for live animals and vehicles, etc. 
within the Control Area.  Consider allowing movement of non-infected animals 
(including vaccinates) according to the Secure Food Supply Plans.  Animals must 
meet vaccination withdrawal period (if it applies) and be able to pass FSIS ante-
mortem inspection to be slaughtered. 
 Stamping-out of Infected and Contact Premises may need to be discontinued. Some 
Infected and Contact Premises (or severely affected individual animals) may be 
depopulated based on epidemiologic or humane considerations. 
 A vaccinate-to-live policy may be considered to reduce the shedding and spread of 
the virus. 
 Officially identify all vaccinated animals for surveillance and monitoring purposes. 
 No new vaccinations will be administered more than 28 days after the last known 
new case of FMD is detected.  Design and implement surveillance to obtain data, 
then apply to the OIE for recovery of FMD-free status while allowing vaccinated 
animals to live out their useful lives. If stamping-out was discontinued, FMD-
freedom without vaccination may be achieved 12 months after the last case or last 
vaccination (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.2). If stamping-out was not discontinued FMD free 
status (without vaccination) may be achieved 6 months after the last case or the last 
FMD vaccine is administered (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.9).  
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TYPE  4  –  WIDES PRE AD O R NATION AL  FMD  OUTBRE AK :    
Widespread areas of infection are detected involving too many herds or herds that are too 
large to depopulate quickly enough to suppress disease spread.  Sufficient vaccine and 
resources are not available to vaccinate all designated susceptible domestic animals in the 
affected regions (Control Areas).  The number of vaccinated animals is too great to consider 
a vaccinate-to-kill or slaughter (only) policy.  Implement a vaccinate-to-live policy with 
continued vaccination after the last case to ensure suppression of virus transmission. 
 Establish an Area Command in each affected region to coordinate Incident 
Management Teams within each respective region. 
 Stamping-out of Infected and Contact Premises may need to be discontinued.  Some 
Infected and Contact Premises (or severely affected individual animals) may be 
depopulated based on epidemiologic or humane considerations.  
 Implement FMD vaccination strategies as appropriate to reduce the shedding and 
spread of the virus.  The strategy implemented (vaccinate-to-kill, live, or slaughter) 
may vary by species, region, or be based on other epidemiological considerations 
and availability of vaccine. 
 Consider allowing movement of non-infected animals (including vaccinates) 
according to the Secure Food Supply Plans.  Animals must meet vaccination 
withdrawal period (if it applies) and be able to pass FSIS ante-mortem inspection to 
be slaughtered. 
 Design and implement surveillance to obtain data, then apply to the OIE for FMD-
free with vaccination status, while allowing vaccinated animals to live out their 
useful lives. FMD-free with vaccination status may be an intermediary step to FMD-
freedom without vaccination. If stamping-out was discontinued, FMD-freedom with 
vaccination can be attained 2 years after the last outbreak as long as there is no 
evidence of virus circulation within the past 12 months (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.3). If 
vaccination is stopped, FMD-free status may be attained 12 months after the last 
evidence of FMD infection and the last FMD vaccine was administered (OIE TAHC 
Article 8.5.2). 
TYPE  5  –  CATAS TRO PHIC FMD  OUTBRE AK :    
Widespread areas of infection are detected involving a large portion of the United States.  
Sufficient vaccine and resources are not available to quickly vaccinate all designated 
susceptible animals in the affected regions.  The number of animals is too great to consider 
only a vaccinate-to-kill or vaccinate-to-slaughter strategy in isolation. Vaccinate-to-kill, 
vaccinate-to-slaughter, and vaccinate-to-live policies may need to be implemented for 
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regions and species, as vaccine availability dictates.  It becomes apparent that FMD is 
widespread, and will not be eradicated within a year.   
 Transition to a program for long-term eradication and control, including vaccinate-
to-live. 
 Severely affected individual animals may be depopulated based on epidemiologic or 
humane considerations.  
 Transition to allowing movement of vaccinated animals (14 days post-vaccination) 
from premises with no current clinical evidence of infection with FMDV.   
 Consider allowing movement of non-infected animals (including vaccinates) 
according to the Secure Food Supply Plans. Animals must meet vaccination 
withdrawal period (if it applies) and be able to pass FSIS ante-mortem inspection to 
be slaughtered. 
 Implement a comprehensive FMD vaccination program once sufficient vaccine 
becomes available. 
 FMD-free status will not be able to be established until the long term control and 
eradication program is successful.  FMD-free with vaccination status may be an 
intermediary step to FMD-freedom without vaccination.  FMD-free status (with 
vaccination) can be attained 2 years after the last outbreak as long as there is no 
evidence of virus circulation within the past 12 months (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.3).  If 
vaccination is stopped, FMD-free status may be attained 12 months after the last 
evidence of FMD infection and the last FMD vaccine was administered (OIE TAHC 
Article 8.5.2). 
TYPE  6  -  NO RTH  AME RICAN FMD  OUTBRE AK :   
Widespread areas of infection are detected involving a large portion of the United States, 
Canada, and/or Mexico.  Sufficient vaccine and resources are not available to quickly 
vaccinate all designated susceptible animals in the affected regions/countries. The number 
of vaccinated animals is too great to consider a vaccinate-to-kill policy. It becomes apparent 
that FMD is widespread, and will not be eradicated within a year.   
 Implement the same steps as a Type 5 outbreak. In addition: 
o Work with officials in Canada and Mexico to implement a North American 
plan for animal and animal product movement. 
o Work with officials in Canada and Mexico to implement a comprehensive 
North American FMD control program, including vaccination once sufficient 
vaccine becomes available. 
o FMD-free status will not be able to be established until the long term control 
and eradication program is successful.  FMD-free with vaccination status may 
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be an intermediary step to FMD-freedom without vaccination.  FMD-free 
status (with vaccination) can be attained 2 years after the last outbreak as 
long as there is no evidence of virus circulation within the past 12 months 
(OIE TAHC Article 8.5.3).   If vaccination is stopped, FMD-free status may be 
attained 12 months after the last evidence of FMD infection and the last FMD 
vaccine was administered (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.2). 
PHASE 3 
Recovery: Surveillance and epidemiologic evidence indicates that the outbreak is under 
control and a plan is implemented to regain FMD-free status (possibly with vaccination).   
PHASE 4 
The United States is declared free of FMD (possibly with vaccination).  The USDA continues to 
work to convince trading partners to accept U.S. exports of animals and animal products.   
VISUALIZING PHASES AND TYPES  
 
Phases of FMD Response 
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Types of FMD Outbreaks 
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Differentiating between Types of FMD Outbreaks 
Outbreak 
Type 
Geographic 
Size of 
Outbreak 
Animal 
Movement 
Number of 
Premises 
Size of 
Premises 
Vaccine 
Assumptions 
Appropriate 
Strategies 
Minimum Time Required to Achieve FMD Free 
Status* 
Type 1-Focal 
FMD 
outbreak 
One state or 
small region 
No extensive 
animal movement 
Small 
number 
Relatively 
small 
Not applicable Stamping-out  
 
FMD-freedom without vaccination: 3 months after the 
last case 
Type 2-
Moderate 
regional FMD 
outbreak 
Few focal 
areas in one 
region 
No extensive 
animal movement 
out of the Control 
Area 
Small to 
moderate 
number 
Small to 
medium 
Sufficient vaccine MAY 
NOT BE  available to 
vaccinate designated 
animals (depending on 
animal density and 
strain) 
Stamping-out 
Vaccinate-to-kill 
Vaccinate-to-slaughter 
Discontinue 
vaccination 28 days 
after the last case 
FMD-freedom without vaccination: 3 months after the 
last case and slaughter of all vaccinated animals, or 6 
months after last case or last vaccination if all 
vaccinated animals are not slaughtered 
Type 3-Large 
regional FMD 
outbreak 
Multiple areas 
in a region 
No extensive 
animal movement 
outside of the 
region 
Moderate 
number  
Medium to 
large 
Sufficient vaccine is 
NOT available to 
vaccinate designated 
animals 
Vaccinate-to-live 
Vaccinate-to-slaughter 
Discontinue 
vaccination 28 days 
after the last case 
If stamping-out was discontinued, FMD-freedom 
without vaccination: 12 months after the last case or 
last vaccination (OIE TAHC Article 8.5.2). If stamping-
out was not discontinued,  FMD freedom without 
vaccination: 6 months after last case or last vaccination 
if all vaccinated animals are not slaughtered 
Type 4-
Widespread 
or national 
FMD 
outbreak 
Widespread 
areas of 
infection 
Extensive animal 
movement 
Moderate to 
large number 
Medium to 
large 
Sufficient vaccine is 
NOT available to 
vaccinate designated 
animals 
Vaccinate-to-live 
Vaccinate-to-slaughter 
Continue vaccination 
after the last case 
FMD- freedom with vaccination may be intermediary 
step; If stamping-out was discontinued, FMD-freedom 
with vaccination can be attained 2 years after the last 
outbreak as long as there is no evidence of virus 
circulation within the past 12 months (OIE TAHC Article 
8.5.3) 
Type 5-
Catastrophic 
FMD 
outbreak 
Widespread 
areas of 
infection 
Extensive animal 
movement 
Large 
number 
Large Sufficient vaccine is 
NOT available to 
vaccinate designated 
animals 
Endemic FMD control 
program 
Vaccinate-to-live 
Continue vaccination 
after the last case  
FMD-free with vaccination status may be an 
intermediary step to FMD-free without vaccination. 
FMD-freedom with vaccination: 2 years after last 
outbreak with no evidence of virus circulation within 12 
months. FMD-freedom without vaccination: 12 months 
after last FMD vaccine administered 
Type 6-North 
American 
FMD 
outbreak 
Widespread 
infection in 
Mexico/  
Canada/US 
Extensive animal 
movement 
Large 
number 
Large Sufficient vaccine is  
NOT available to 
vaccinate designated 
animals 
Endemic FMD control 
program 
Vaccinate-to-live 
Continue vaccination 
after the last case 
FMD-free with vaccination status may be an 
intermediary step to FMD-free without vaccination. 
FMD-freedom with vaccination: 2 years after last 
outbreak with no evidence of virus circulation within 12 
months. FMD-freedom without vaccination: 12 months 
after last FMD vaccine administered 
Vaccinate-to-kill; killing means any procedure which causes the death of an animal that does not enter the human food chain. 
Vaccinate-to-slaughter; slaughter means any procedure which causes the death of an animal by bleeding where the animal may enter the human food chain. 
Vaccinate-to-live: the animal is allowed to live out its useful life span. 
*Actual time to regain export markets will likely be longer. 
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Responding to Different Types of FMD Outbreaks 
 Incident 
Management 
Quarantine & 
Movement Control 
Surveillance for 
Recovery of 
Freedom 
Implementation of 
selected response 
strategy 
Vaccination 
Type 1-Focal FMD 
outbreak 
Establish Incident 
Command. 
Continue strict quarantine 
and movement control for 
live animals, animal 
products, and vehicles 
within the Control Area 
(movement as permitted by 
specific Secure Food Supply 
Plans). 
Implement surveillance 
to prove recovery of 
FMD-free status. FMD-
free status may be 
regained 3 months after 
last case (OIE TAHC). 
Continue stamping-out 
with rapid depopulation, 
disposal, cleaning, and 
disinfection of Infected 
and Contact Premises. 
Order FMD vaccine. 
Determine if vaccination is 
appropriate, depending on 
epidemiological situation; 
evaluate if vaccination will 
be required if outbreak 
grows into Type 2. 
Type 2-Moderate 
regional FMD 
outbreak 
Establish Area 
Command to 
coordinate 
multiple Incident 
Management 
Teams in the 
affected region. 
Continue strict quarantine 
and movement control for 
live animals, vehicles, etc. 
Consider allowing 
movement of non-infected 
animals (including 
vaccinates) according to the 
Secure Food Supply Plans.  
Implement surveillance 
to prove recovery of 
FMD-free status. FMD-
free status can be 
attained 3 months after 
the last case and the 
slaughter of all 
vaccinated animals or 6 
months after the last 
case or last vaccination 
if all vaccinated animals 
are not slaughtered (OIE 
TAHC). 
Continue stamping-out, 
as appropriate; consider 
initiating vaccinate-to-
kill and vaccinate-to-
slaughter strategies. 
Establish Vaccination Zones 
if vaccination is going to be 
used. No new vaccination 
will be administered more 
than 28 days after the last 
new case of FMD is 
detected. Healthy 
vaccinated livestock with 
no current clinical evidence 
of infection may move to 
slaughter after vaccine 
withdrawal period. 
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 Incident 
Management 
Quarantine & 
Movement Control 
Surveillance for 
Recovery of 
Freedom 
Implementation of 
selected response 
strategy 
Vaccination 
Type 3-Large 
regional FMD 
outbreak 
Establish Area 
Command to 
coordinate 
multiple Incident 
Management 
Teams in the 
affected region. 
Continue strict quarantine 
and movement control for 
live animals, vehicles, etc. 
Consider allowing 
movement of non-infected 
animals (including 
vaccinates) according to the 
Secure Food Supply Plans. 
Implement surveillance 
to prove recovery of 
FMD-free status. If 
stamping-out was 
discontinued, FMD 
freedom without 
vaccination can be 
achieved 12 months 
after last case or last 
vaccination. If stamping-
out was not 
discontinued, FMD 
freedom without 
vaccination can be 
achieved 6 months after 
last case or last 
vaccination if all 
vaccinated animals are 
not slaughtered. 
Stamping-out of 
Infected and Contact 
Premises may need to 
be discontinued; some 
Infected and Contact 
Premises may be 
depopulated based on 
epidemiologic or 
humane considerations. 
Initiate vaccinate-to-live 
policy. 
Establish Vaccination 
Zones. No new vaccination 
will be administered more 
than 28 days after the last 
new case of FMD is 
detected. Healthy 
vaccinated livestock with 
no current clinical evidence 
of infection may move to 
slaughter after vaccine 
withdrawal period. 
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 Incident 
Management 
Quarantine & 
Movement Control 
Surveillance for 
Recovery of 
Freedom 
Implementation of 
selected response 
strategy 
Vaccination 
Type 4-Widespread 
or national FMD 
outbreak 
Establish an Area 
Command in each 
affected region to 
coordinate 
Incident 
Management 
Teams within their 
respective regions. 
Consider allowing 
movement of non-infected 
animals (including 
vaccinates) according to the 
Secure Food Supply Plans.  
Implement surveillance 
to prove recovery of 
FMD freedom, FMD 
freedom with 
vaccination may be 
intermediary step; If 
stamping-out was 
discontinued, FMD-
freedom with 
vaccination can be 
attained 2 years after 
the last outbreak as long 
as there is no evidence 
of virus circulation 
within the past 12 
months. 
Stamping-out of 
Infected and Contact 
Premises may need to 
be discontinued; some 
Infected and Contact 
Premises may be 
depopulated based on 
epidemiologic or 
humane considerations. 
Implement a vaccinate-
to-live policy with 
continued vaccination 
after the last case to 
ensure suppression of 
virus transmission. 
Establish Vaccination 
Zones. Vaccinate-to-live 
with continued vaccination 
after the last case to ensure 
suppression of virus 
transmission. Healthy 
vaccinated livestock with 
no current clinical evidence 
of infection may move to 
slaughter after vaccine 
withdrawal period. 
Type 5-
Catastrophic FMD 
outbreak 
Transition to a long 
term control and 
eradication 
program. 
Transition to allowing 
movement of vaccinated 
animals (14 days post-
vaccination) from premises 
with no current clinical 
evidence of infection with 
FMDV. Consider allowing 
movement of non-infected 
animals (including 
vaccinates) according to the 
Secure Food Supply Plans. 
If and when appropriate, 
implement surveillance 
to prove that the long-
term control and 
eradication program is 
successful (with or 
without vaccination).  
Some animals may be 
depopulated based on 
epidemiologic or 
humane considerations. 
Implement a vaccinate- 
to-live policy, continued 
after the last case; 
vaccine use will need to 
be prioritized. 
Prioritize regions and herds 
to receive the limited 
vaccine. Vaccinate-to-live 
with continued vaccination 
in long term control 
program to ensure 
suppression of virus 
transmission. Healthy 
vaccinated livestock with 
no current clinical evidence 
of infection may move to 
slaughter after vaccine 
withdrawal period. 
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 Incident 
Management 
Quarantine & 
Movement Control 
Surveillance for 
Recovery of 
Freedom 
Implementation of 
selected response 
strategy 
Vaccination 
Type 6-North 
American FMD 
outbreak 
[see Type 5]  
Work with officials 
in Canada and 
Mexico to 
implement a 
comprehensive 
North American 
FMD control 
program, including 
vaccination. 
[see Type 5] 
Work with officials in 
Canada and Mexico to 
implement a North 
American plan for animal 
and animal product 
movement. 
If and when appropriate, 
implement surveillance 
to prove that long-term 
control and eradication 
program is successful in 
each of the countries 
(with or without 
vaccination). 
[see Type 5] [see Type 5] 
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OIE Definition of Stamping-Out 
Means carrying out under the authority of the Veterinary Authority, on confirmation of a disease, the 
killing of the animals which are affected and those suspected of being affected in the herd and, where 
appropriate, those in other herds which have been exposed to infection by direct animal to animal 
contact, or by indirect contact of a kind likely to cause the transmission of the causal pathogen. All 
susceptible animals, vaccinated or unvaccinated, on an infected premises should be killed and their 
carcasses destroyed by burning or burial, or by any other method which will eliminate the spread of 
infection through the carcasses or products of the animals killed. 
This policy should be accompanied by the cleansing and disinfection procedures defined in the 
Terrestrial Code. 
The term modified stamping-out policy should be used in communications to the OIE whenever the 
above animal health measures are not implemented in full and details of the modifications should be 
given. 
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